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include the impact of various external sourcing strategies.  R&D  cooperation and to  a lesser extent 
R&D contracted out are found to have a significant positive effect on internal R&D but only if the 
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time firms are found to be more likely engaged in R&D cooperation, the more they spend on internal 
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Innovative  strategies  have  become  a  central  focus  in  firms'  competitiveness  in  an 
increasingly  global  economy.  Firms  competing  in  global  markets  face  the  challenge  and 
opportunities  from  the  convergence  of consumer  preferences  and  the  pace  and  scope  of 
technological change, engaging them in extensive and risky sunk R&D expenditures.  As  a 
consequence  firms  are  relying  extensively  on  external  linkages.  The  pervasiveness  of 
networking has become a significant feature in current innovation management practice. In 
view of the increasing complexity and multidisciplinarity of research, even the largest and 
most  self-contained  of organisations  requires  information  from  beyond  its  boundaries. 
Innovation  increasingly  derives  from  a  network of companies  interacting  in  a  variety of 
ways, that move beyond traditional R&D contracting.  In their strive for access to external 
know-how, the exploitation of complementarities between partners and sharing of risks and 
costs, while internalizing spillover effects, firms revert to cooperative modes ranging from 
R&D consortia, joint ventures, implicit coordination, mutual exchange or "informal" know-
how  trading  (von  Hippel  (1987)),  and  this  despite  the  possible  higher  transaction  costs 
associated with external sourcing (Pisano (1990)). 
Ample theoretical and empirical research exists on firm  and industry characteristics 
most conductive to innovation, dating back to  Schumpeter's work on firm  size and market 
concentration, and reviewed by Cohen & Levin (1989). But rather than trying to identify any 
single  type  of firm  that  is  most  innovative,  the  theoretical  and  a  fortiori  the  empirical 
literature is less ample when dealing with complementarities and relationships among firms 
and  other  institutions  that  may  facilitate  innovation.  Induced  by  influences  from 
evolutionary economics, innovation theory has shifted from the traditional linear innovation 
model to  the  interactionist or integrated  model (Kline & Rosenberg (1986)),  emphasizing 
technological  progress  as  a  result  of  interaction  between  knowledge-producing  and 
knowledge-using  agents.  This  new  approach  is  at  the  heart  of the  concept  of national 
innovation sytems (Freeman (1987), Nelson (1993) a.o.). Within  this  interactionist  model,  the  more  specific  relationship  between  external 
linkages  and  own  in  house  R&D  activitities,  remains  a  complex  issue.  Although  the 
availability of external technology may discourage -and hence substitute for- own research 
investment by the  receiver firms,  there  are  also  arguments  to  stress  the  complementarity 
between  in-house  R&D  and  external  know-how.  Own  in-house  R&D  activities  are  often 
indicated  as  reducing  some  of the  inefficiencies  and  problems  associated  with  external 
acquisition, if only because it allows to modify and improve external acquisition.  But also 
external technology is often only available on an exchange basis, certainly in the cooperative 
types  of sourcing.  As  Baumol  (1993)  notes  "In  some  cases  the  arrangement  is  totally 
informal,  each  firm  simply expecting full  access  to  the  innovation of the  rival,  with  full 
provision  of its  own  technological  advances  serving  as  the  quid  pro  quo"  (see  also  von 
Hippel (1987)).  Furthermore, the capacity to go  for  it alone increases a firm's bargaining 
power  in  negotiating  with  external  partners.  Contractor  (1983)  for  instance,  finds  the 
licensing fees to be smaller when the receiver firm has a well developed R&D group. 
Although  external  know-how  can  help  partners  to  capitalize  on  mutual 
complementarities,  managing  external  acquisitions  is  a  far  from  simple  task.  External 
information cannot easily enter the closed information system, even when its contribution is 
unquestionned, because of  screening problems in finding and acquiring external information, 
but also  because of problems in  implementing external know-how.  External  information, 
often felt by own R&D personnel as an implicit indictment of its own R&D, needs to be fit 
internally, overcoming the 'not invented here' syndrome.  Suitable organisational structures 
and incentive schemes need to be devised to stimulate external learning.  Not surprisingly a 
"learning organisation" has been characterized as an organisation skilled at not only creating, 
but also acquiring and transferring knowledge and at modifying its  behavior to reflect new 
knowledge and  insights (Garvin (1993)).  Sen & Rubinstein (1989)  identify how  in-house 
R&D  can  alleviate  problems  in  the  various  phases  of the  process  of acquiring  and 
implementing external technology.  They stress  however,  that given  the  many  inter- and 
intra-organisational as well as personal factors hampering the role of in-house R&D groups, 
an involvement from  in-house R&D groups from the start is necessary, moving beyond mere 
troub Ie-shooting. 
Also Rothwell (1992) stresses that linkages with external sources of scientific and 
technological know-how are only effective when the organisation exhibits a willingness to 
take on external ideas, requiring the presence of key individuals, the so-called technological 
gatekeepers  (Allen  (1986)).  The  resulting  scale  economies  in  effective  external  R&D 
strategies  may  disadvantage small firms.  The  specific problems of SMEs  in  establishing 
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that a SME's ability to access external know-how is conditioned by its in-house employment 
of  qualified technical specialists and scientists and engineers. 
While external linkages considered so far,  imply some active involvement or consent 
from  the sending party, the difficulties in  appropriating know-how allow for knowledge to 
diffuse and  external know-how to  be  accessed without any explicit involvement from  the 
sending  party  and  even  despite  attempts  from  firms  generating  know-how  to  keep  this 
proprietary (Arrow (1962».  Mobility of researchers, reverse engineering are  but a few of 
such phenomena that generates these spillovers (Mansfield (1985».  By now an extensive 
theoretical literature has  developed around the effects of spillovers on own R&D  (see De 
Bondt (1995) for a review), stressing that it substitutes for own R&D in the receiving firm, 
but that  it also  reduces  own  R&D  by the  sending  firm  to  the  extent that it  cannot fully 
internalize all benefits, cfthe disincentive effect (Spence (1984»  and this typically despite a 
market enhancement or cost reducing effect that should stimulate efforts.  The size of these 
effects depend of  course on the size of the spillovers and the degree of competition between 
firms.  Also the level of  commitment to R&D strategies and the firm's network structure will 
matter. 
Similarly in this literature it is argued that a firm's ability to identify, assimilate and 
exploit existing external technologies can be enhanced by own R&D (e.g.  Harabi (1995». 
The notion of 'absorptive capacity'  introduced by Cohen & Levinthal (1989) stresses the 
importance of  a stock of prior knowledge to effectively absorb spillovers.  In such a setting, 
the desire to  assimilate external know-how creates a positive incentive to  invest in  R&D. 
Hence spillovers may rather than diminish own R&D encourage equilibrium industry R&D 
investments.  Also Levin & Reiss (1988) show that when spillover productivity increases, 
spillovers  will  stimulate  own  R&D  since  the  productivity  of the  latter  is  enhanced  by 
increases in industry knowledge. 
In  conclusion external  know  how may  stimulate  rather than  substitute own  R&D 
activities  at  least  when  in-house  R&D  groups  are  optimally  tuned  to  absorb  effectively 
external  know-how.  However,  when  the  technology  strategy  of a  company  is  not 
explicitizing the link between in-house development and external acquisition, such in-house 
R&D groups may hamper rather than stimulate effective external linkages. 
When confronting these hypotheses with empirical evidence, the first thing to notice 
is the relative scarcity of empirical research on the link between external and internal R&D. 
Gambardella (1991) finds from case studies of  a few large US drug manufacturers that firms 
with  better  in-house  scientific  research  programs  have  exploited  more  effectively outside 
3 scientific information.  More indirect evidence from the pharmaceuticals industry is provided 
by Henderson &  Cockburn (1996), whose results seem to indicate that there are significant 
returns to size, with a primary advantage of large firms being able to capture and use internal 
and external spillovers of knowledge.  In biotechnology, Arora &  Gambardella (1990) find 
evidence  of large  firms  with  higher  internal  knowledge  to  be  more  actively  involved  III 
pursuing  strategies  of external  linkages.  However,  Pisano  (1990)  found  US  firms  in 
biotechnology to be more likely involved in-only in-house R&D  in  those areas where they 
have  accumulated  in-house  R&D.  Going  further  back  in  time,  the  SAPPHO  project,  a 
comprehensive  study  of the  success  factors  for  innovation,  already  stressed  the  central 
importance  of external  collaboration  with  users  and  external  sources  of scientific  and 
technical expertise.  Both formal and informal networks were demonstrated to be important, 
although  the  latter  appeared  to  be  the  most  important.  Freeman  (1991)  cites  empirical 
evidence of research associations, as well as licensing transactions, to be used intensively by 
firms  who have their own R&D,  thus concluding that these strategies are complementary 
rather  than  substituting  for  indigeneous  innovation.  Empirical  estimates  of the  size  of 
technology  spillovers,  measured  between  sectors  or between  firms,  is  provided  by  a.o. 
Scherer (1982), Verspagen (1995), Jaffe (1989), Harabi (1995)). 
While  the  litterature  as  it  stands  today  is  only  starting  to  unravel  the  complex 
phenomenon of linkages between internal and external R&D strategies, this paper presents an 
empirical analysis using firm  level data of Flemish innovative firms.  Given the typically 
small and open character of  the Belgian economy, the analysis will include a special focus on 
the differential behavior of SMEs as  well as affiliates of larger multinational entities. The 
empirical model  is  an  extension of the classical studies on R&D  determinants.  Standard 
explanatory  variables  like  size,  diversification,  ownership  structure  and  technological 
opportunity are  included to  explain firm's expenditures on  internally financed  intra-muros 
R&D.  The  major  focus  of the  analysis  is  of course  on  the  extension  towards  external 
sourcing  strategies  and  their  impact  on  own  in-house  R&D  expenditures.  In  addition, 
external sourcing may also have an impact on technological performance, raising innovative 
output without  affecting  innovative  input.  However,  given  a  lack of data  on  innovative 
output for the sample, this effect cannot be empirically assessed. 
Various  modes  to  acquire  externally  developed  technology  are  considered  in  the 
analysis.  Next to buying technology through licensing contracts or embodied in equipment, 
firms can contract out R&D activities to agents, other firms related or not, private or public 
research  institutions.  But  avoiding  costs  and  problems  of market  transactions,  firms 
increasingly revert to cooperative modes of R&D to get access to external know-how.  This 
4 cooperation may be  simple coordination of R&D  activities over exchange of information 
over jointly researching  or  developing  in  a  research joint venture  or  consortium.  With 
perhaps the exception of  the (poor quality) information on embodied technological purchase, 
the external sourcing strategies in  the empirical analysis are restricted to those involving a 
consenting position of the sending  party.  More  implicit,  informal  spillovers  are  hard to 
quantify and therefore are excluded in the analysis. 
The  next  section  will  detail  the  hypotheses  and  variables  used,  while  section  3 
presents the results.  A concluding section summarizes. 
2. The hypotheses 
2.1. The sample 
The  data  are  analysed  at  the  firm  level.  The  sample  consists  of about  290  Flemish 
companies, surveyed on their R&D expenditures for the period 1992-1993.  The survey only 
includes companies active in R&D.  The long tradition of  this bi-annual questionnaire on the 
basis of the  Frascatti-methodology,  serving for  the OECD statistics,  as  well as  a core of 
large, regular respondants, improves the quality of the quantative data, collected through this 
survey. 
The sample, which is only representative for R&D active companies clearly illustrate 
that R&D is  a highly concentrated phenomenon in Flanders.  Three quarters of the sample 
companies have less than 200 employees and account for 12% of total reported R&D.  The 
7.5% of companies in the sample with more than 1000 employees not surprisingly accounts 
for almost 70% of reported expenditures.  Besides two key sectors, the chemicals (include 
pharmaceuticals) and IT (audio/video and telecom), who account for resp 44% and 33% of 
reported R&D, a second tier of sectors including electronics, metals manufacturing, software 
services  &  food  can  be  identified.  Companies  from  other  sectors,  29%  of the  sample, 
represent only 3% of reported R&D.  About one third of the respondents have a majority of 
foreign ownership (mostly fully owned).  These significantly larger firms account for 84% of 
total reported R&D.  Most of the respondents, 73%, are not diversified outside their Nace 3 
digit sector.  A more complete discription of the sample and the survey methodology can be 
found in Veugelers & Steurs (1995). 
5 2.2 The variables 
Since the  survey gives  no  information on  innovative  output, the  inputs  employed by the 
company in  its  R&D  process is  used as  a  measure of technological performance for the 
dependent  variable.  The  variable  IRD  includes  the  internally  financed  intra-muros 
expenditures for each firm for the year 1993.  The amounts that firms spend on extra-muros 
R&D, i.e. in the context of R&D contracted out,  is of  course excluded on the left-hand side, 
since they will appear on the right hand side.  Also excluded are the amounts received from 
R&D contracts as well as government subsidies, leaving only the internally financed R&D. 
For the sample companies, performing R&D for other entities through R&D contracts  is 
rather unimportant.  It  represents on average 10% of  all intra-muros expenditures. 
The basic specification to explain firm expenditures on internal R&D is as follows: 
+ (f\ CHEM + f2 IT + f3 INFO + f4 MVEN) 
+ g log SUBj 
(1) 
The variable Sj  is a proxy for size, measured by sales.  Size as determinant of innovative 
activity is one of the major hyptheses associated with Schumpeter.  Economies of scale in 
R&D, the ability to spread risks over a portfolio of projects and access to a larger pool of 
financial  means,  give  large firms  an advantage over smaller firms.  However,  flexibility, 
adaptability,  an efficient  internal  communication  process  of typically  smaller  companies 
allow a more rapid response to external opportunities and threats and may give an edge to 
smaller innovative firms.  The survey results indeed display a U-shaped relation between size 
and  R&D  intensity  with the  smallest,  <20  employees,  i.e.  20%  of the  sample,  having  a 
sample average R&D intensity of 11 %.  1  The  logaritmic  specification will  support the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis with b> 1 (see Kamien &  Schwartz (1982) for  a  more detailed 
discussion).  To avoid possible  simultaneity problems,  with  R&D  determining  firm  size, 
sales in 1992 is used, i.e. one year lag vis-a-vis the dependent variable. 
1 •  Note that this high R&D intensity should not be extrapolated outside the sample of innovative firms 
to all small firms. 
6 With R&D remaining a very centralized function within a multinational company, 
the  R&D  strategy of subsidiary  companies  in  host  economies  may  be  seriously  affected 
positively or negatively by the parent company (see Veugelers & Vanden Houte (1990».  To 
test the differential behavior of subsidiaries, a dummy Mj =  1 if the firm  is  majority foreign 
owned,  else  zero.  Given that subsidiaries are typically larger firms  and  belong to  larger 
concerns, there is also an interaction with the size variable.  The coefficient of  this interactive 
term,  c,  allows  to  test  whether  subsidiaries  enjoy  economies  of scale  beyond  those  for 
domestic firms (see also Holemans & Sleuwaegen (1988». 
Related to size is  the effect of diversification upon R&D.  Dating back to Nelson 
(1959) economies of scope in R&D call for a positive effect of diversification upon R&D. 
Remains to be  seen whether diversification, after correcting for  size  still has  a significant 
positive impact. DIVj  is a dummy which is 0 if the company is undiversified (i.e. realizes all 
sales in the same sector); else 1 
As  many  other  studies  have  indicated,  industry  dummies  to  correct  for  fixed 
industry effects, capturing differences in technological regimes, is a practice introduced by 
Scherer (1965) and widely diffused in subsequent work given its often significant impact (see 
eg  Audretch  (1995».  These  industry  dummies  may  be  capturing  various  technology 
dimensions as  stressed by several authors (eg Teece (1986), Breschi, Orsenigo & Malerba 
(1996»  such  as  technological  opportunity,  appropriability  regimes,  dynamic  aspects  as 
cumulativeness or the emergence of dominant designs along the technology life cycle, the 
necessity for complementary and specialized assets, when implementing innovations.  Four 
such significant industry dummies are retained in the analysis: 
CHEM  chemicals industry (include pharmaceuticals)  Nace 23-25 
IT  Information Technology  Nace 32 
INFO  Informatics Services  Nace 72 
MVEN Metals Manufacturing & Electronics  Nace 28,29,31,34 
The impact of government support on firm  R&D has drawn considerable attention in the 
literature  evolving  around  the  issue  of additionality.  Do  subsidies  simply  substitute  for 
company financed R&D, or can it complement/enhance the latter, raising it beyond critical 
levels?  To  test this  hypothesis,  the  variable  10gSUBj  is  included,  which  measures  the 
amount  of subsidies  received  from  governments  (regional,  national  and  international). 
Amounts of 1992,  i.e.  one  year  lagged vis-a-vis the  dependent variable  IRD,  are  used to 
circumvent possible simultaneity following from an inclination towards selectivity of  subsidy 
policy.  A positive coefficient would suggest an additive effect of subsidies.  A first look at 
the data already reveals that subsidies are a restricted but very concentrated phenomenon.  In 
7 the sample, subsidies account for 5% of  total reported R&D, including no specific size effect. 
Only 15% of  the repondents reported receiving subsidies.  85% of  total reported subsidies go 
to only 5 companies. 
The major focus of the analysis is  on the relationship between internal in-house R&D and 
external technological linkages.  While the overall technological strength of a company is 
directly  related  to  its  size  and  technological  opportunity,  acquiring  technology  from  the 
outside may not be neutral to its R&D decisions. The availability of  external technology may 
discourage  and  hence  substitute for  own  research  investment.  But as  shown  supra,  it  is 
increasingly stressed in the literature that when inter-firm transfers occur, they do not stand 
as an all-or-nothing substitute for in-house development. 
To  test the  effects  of external  R&D  technology  sourcing  on  in-house  R&D,  the 
following variables are included: the variable ERDi represents firms'  expenditures on R&D 
contracted out, including R&D contracting to other firms, as well as research institutes.  This 
contracting phenomenon is on average for the sample companies rather modest.  About one 
third of the respondents have reported non-zero contracting budgets.  Only 10% of the total 
R&D budget is  spent on extra-muros activitities.  This percentage is  somewhat higher, but 
not significantly, for large companies with foreign majority and also for companies without 
an own R&D department. 
Besides R&D contracting, the growing importance of collaborative R&D strategies 
is captured through COOPi , a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the firm  is 
engaged in R&D cooperation, else O.  Since data on cooperation are not part of the official 
OECD statistical requirements, the current survey only scantly collects information on this 
phenomenon.  No indication can  be  given  on  the  importance of cooperation  in  terms  of 
budgets spent on cooperation, as well as the form in which such cooperation prevails.  Only 
the type of partners involved, other firms, related or not, versus research institutes (include 
universities) can be indicated.  Six out of 10 sample companies report cooperation in R&D, a 
frequency that is higher for large companies and in high-tech sectors.  Further indications of 
complementarity between own R&D and cooperation, is  provided by the higher percentage 
of cooperation for companies with R&D departments.  Also interesting to note is the higher 
percentage for foreign owned companies. 
Finally  firms'  expenditures  on  buying  external  technology,  BUYi  ,  includes 
technology acquisition embodied in equipment as well as licensing expenditures.  Given that 
again  this  information  is  only  collected  as  an  appendix  to  the  official  OECD  required 
8 information, the quality of this quantitative information is  less obvious 2  and the restricted 
respons on this question reduces the effective sample to  129 observerations when including 
this variable.  Results will be reported as an extension, but the variable is not retained in the 
basic specification. 
The coefficients of log ERDj, COOPj, and  log BUYj , resp m,  , n,  and  I,  , allow to 
test  whether  these  various  sources  of external  know-how  substitutes,  if  negative,  or 
complements, if positive, own R&D.  To test in addition the role of in-house R&D activities 
on  the  effect of external  know-how  on  internal  R&D  expenditures,  each  of the  external 
sources has an interaction effect included: 
RDP*(logEMj *m2  + COOPj *n2  + log BUYj * 12 ) 
where RDP is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 of  the firms has an own R&D department 
with full-time R&D personnel.  Following the literature, this seems to be a good proxy for 
absorptive  capacity.  A  more  indepth  approach  to  the  firm's  willingness  to  absorb,  its 
organisational  culture and the  specific  profile of its  researchers  which  further  shape  this 
absorptive capacity is unfortunately impossible, given the lack of  available data on this level. 
About 43% of the sample companies have a staffed R&D departement.  This percentage is 
considerably higher for  large companies and  in  high-tech sectors  indicating economies of 
scale. 
The  discussion  on the  linkage  between  internal  and  external  R&D  strategies  has 
made eminent that there exists a two-way causality, a simultaneous relationship between the 
two phenomena.  Not only may external R&D stimulate or discourage own R&D, the fact 
that own R&D may enhance the efficiency of external strategies will induce those firms that 
have own R&D to be more engaged in  external strategies.  This holds a fortiori  for those 
companies with in-house R&D and may results in an upwardly biased coefficient. 3 To avoid 
this  simultaneity  problem  as  much  as  possible,  lagged  variables  are  used  for  external 
strategies where possible.  Hence while the internal R&D expenditures IRD are for 1993, the 
expenditures for ERD and BUY span  1992.4  The information on  COOP  is  time-unrelated 
2  This  holds  certainly  with  respect to  embodied  technological  purchase  which  takes  the  bulk  of 
externally bought technologies.  While all types of buying technology account for  10% of the total 
R&D expenditures in the sample, licensens only account for 1  % of  these expenditures. 
3 Internal R&D  expenditures are  significantly larger for those companies that have cooperation (at a 
3%  significance  level).  But after controlling for  size,  there  is  no  longer any  difference  in  internal 
expenditures between cooperating and non-cooperating firms at least for large firms.  Only for SMEs a 
significant difference remains.  Similarly when correcting for the presence of an R&D department, for 
those  firms  with  such  departments,  there  is  no  significant difference  in  internal  R&D  expenditures 
between cooperative and non-cooperative firms. 
4  One could of  course argue that a strong correlation over time of these variables exist.  The correlation 
between EM and EM.!  is indeed significant, as well as for the licensing expenditures. Alternatives as a 
9 and hence cannot be  lagged.  To tackle the simultaneity problem between cooperation and 
internal R&D, a structural equation model for both internal R&D and cooperation, taken into 
account  the  mutual  relation  between  the  two  phenomena  is  used.  Indeed  Colombo  & 
Garrone  (1996),  after  testing  the  Granger  causality  relationship  between  a  firm's  R&D 
intensity and its technology cooperative agreements, conclude that their results "suggest that 
a simultaneous two-equation model is the appropriate framework to study firm's decisions on 
in-house R&D intensity and technological cooperation" (1996, p 930.) 
The structural equations can be represented as follows 
r  10gIRD= Zi X1RD + COOP*(nl + n2RDP)  (2.1) 
Lcoop = Zc XcoOP  + logIRD*w  (2.2) 
While equation (2.1) is equivalent to (1), the proxies that are used as independent variables to 
explain cooperation  are  size,  ownership,  diversification  and  fixed  industry effects.  Also 
included is the importance of research rather than development in the innovative strategy of 
firms, through the PRES variable (expenditures on research as % of total R&D spending). 
The  strategic  management  literature  often  suggest  that  basic  research  is  more  prone  to 
networking.  The more fundamental  is  the nature of R&D,  the higher the risks  involved, 
which  can  be  shared  or  better  controlled  in  cooperation.  In  addition  the  industrial 
organisation literature argues that for more basic research, spillovers are larger and hence 
induce  firms  to  engage more  in  cooperative  R&D  to  internalize these spillovers  (see eg 
Kesteloot & Veugelers (1995)). 
While  internal  R&D  is  a  normal  continuous  variable,  cooperation  can  only  be 
assessed  through  a  dichotomous  variable.  Two-stage  methods  for  models  with  mixed 
dichotomous & continuous variables are described in Amemiya (1979).  The reduced form 
(3.1) 
where X includes all the exogeneous variables X1RD  and Xcoop , can be estimated by OLS 
while the reduced form 
*  *  *  COOP  = II2  X + V2  (3.2) 
is estimated by probit ML.  Note that because COOP is  only observed dichotomously, only 
II2'  can be estimated which is equal to II2/cr2 with cr/=var (V2)' II2 and V2  correspond to the 
reduced form of the continuous version of COOP.  After substituting the estimated I\II2'  X 
for COOP in  (2.1), the latter can be estimated by OLS and similarly equation (2.2) can be 
estimated by probit ML after substituting I\IIt'  X for IRD.  Note that since only II2' -and not 
simultaneous-equation-approach, is geven the skewedness of the phenomenon of R&D contracting, not 
practical. 
10 II2 is identified, the estimated coefficient for COOP in (2.1) is *(nJ  + n2RDP) times 0'2, while 
the estimated coefficient for Xcoop and IRD are resp Zcf0'2 and W/0'2. 















3. The Results 
Table 1: A list o/variables 
internally financed intra-muros expenditures for R&D, 1993 
company sales, 1992 
diversification dummy, equal to 0 ifundiversified; else 1 
industry dummy for Chemicals (include. pharmaceuticals) 
industry dummy for Information Technology 
service dummy for Informatics Services 
industry dummy for Metals Manufacturing & Electronics 
multinationality dummy, equal to 1 if company is majority foreign owned; else 0 
amount of  subsidies received from governments, 1992 
extra-muros expenditures for R&D, 1992 
cooperation dummy, equal to 1 if  company is engaged in R&D cooperation 
expenditures for technology acquisition embodied in equipment and for 
licensing external technology, 1992 
absorptive capacity dummy, equal to 1 if  the firm has own R&D department & personnel 
% of  total R&D expenditures accruing to Research 
Insert table 2 here 
Table 2 shows the estimation results on the complete sample. Missing observations on some 
of the variables reduced the effective sample to 180.  The discussion focuses mostly on the 
second-stage  internal  R&D  results  (see  equation  (T2.1a)).  But the  structural  modelling 
approach also  yields  interesting results on  the  determinants of cooperation, which will be 
reported and discussed as well. 
The  most  important  variable  to  explain  internal  R&D,  i.e.  with  the  highest 
contribution to total R2,  is the size variable.  Its coefficient, significantly positive and smaller 
than  1,  suggests  that  internal  R&D  expenditures  increase  with  sales  but  less  than 
proportionally.  This is  in line with most other studies which tend to find positive but weak 
effects of size on R&D (intensity) (see Cohen & Levin (1989)).  Note that the reported size 
effect only holds for R&D active companies. 
For foreign controlled firms,  internal R&D expenditures increase more with size as 
compared to domestic firms (0.=12%).  A similar result for Belgium was found in Holemans 
11 &  Sleuwaegen (1988)).  Taking into account that foreign  owned firms  are  typically larger 
than their domestic counterparts, these results might reflect a non-linear relationship between 
firm size and R&D as found by others, e.g. Bound et al (1984).  Nevertheless, foreign owned 
companies have  lower R&D  expenditures after controlling for  other determinants,  witness 
the negative coefficient of Mj (a=  17%).  This might reflect the centralization of R&D within 
the foreign parent company resulting in lower own R&D activities within local subsidiaries. 5 
The four industry dummies, which are included to capture inter-industry differences 
in technological opportunity, but could also be measuring other unspecified industry effects, 
such as demand pull, are all highly significant, again in line with previous studies (see Cohen 
&  Levin (1989)).  Also in  line with previous studies is the unclear effect of diversification, 
which, when controlling for size and industry effects fails to influence significantly internal 
R&D expenditures.  This result can also be related to the specific character of the  sample 
where most of  the companies are undiversified. 
The estimates for government sponsored R&D are significantly positive, suggesting 
that subsidies seem to stimulate internal R&D expenditures.  The point estimate of 0.14 is 
similar to those found in other studies for Canada &  USA (see Mansfield &  Switzer (1985)). 
Before  turning to the  discussion of the external  sourcing  strategies,  it  should  be 
pointed  out  that these  results  on  the  more  classical  determinants  of R&D  performance, 
remain robust across the various results for external sourcing. Most of  the discussion will be 
based on contracting and cooperation as external sourcing strategies, since the buy-variable is 
less reliable and substantially reduces the effective sample. 
If one  would  ignore  the  absorptive  capacity  through  the  interaction  term,  see 
equation  (T3.1)  in  table  3,  the  coeffcient  measuring  the  effect of expenditures  on  R&D 
outsourcing  on  internal  R&D  expenditures,  is  positive  and  significant,  indicating  a 
complementary relationship.  Cooperative R&D  engagements seem  to  have  no  significant 
impact  on  internal  R&D  expenditures.  The  coefficient  is  positive,  indicating  a 
complementary character, but it's far from significant. It is only when explicitly taking into 
account absorptive capacity that external sourcing becomes significant in explaining internal 
R&D expenditures. 
The basic regression is Equation (T2.1a) in table 2, which includes the interaction of 
log ERD and COOP with the presence of  a staffed R&D lab.  The results seem to suggest that 
for R&D contracted out, there is  only a significant effect on own R&D when own in-house 
5.  This pattern typically prevails in car manufacturing, where foreign plants are mainly assembly.  In 
other  sectors,  Belgium/Flanders  has  occasionally  succeeded  in  establishing  subsidiaries  that  are 
(European) research centers. 
12 R&D infrastructure is present.  Note however that the size of the coefficient suggest only a 
small complementary effect. An increase in extra-muros expenditures by 10% increases own 
in-house expenditures by about 1  %. Unfortunately no data are available for different sources 
of  extra-muros expenditures 6. 
The effects of  external sourcing through R&D cooperation, although only measured 
through a dichotomous variable, are more distinct.  On average, after correcting for company 
and  industry  characteristics,  firms  engaging  in  R&D  cooperation  seem  to  spend  less  on 
internal R&D, pointing in the direction of a substitute relationship, but the effect is far from 
significant.  For firms  that have  own  in-house  staffed  R&D departments,  cooperation  is 
associated with significantly higher internal R&D expenditures.  Note that since the size of 
the coefficient includes ci, only the sign but not the size of  the effect can be determined. 
The  second  stage  probit  ML  results  for  COOP  (see  equation  T1.1b)  reveal  that 
indeed firms who spend more on internal R&D have a  significantly higher probability of 
cooperating7•  Again size is a significant determinant of cooperative behavior, with smaller 
innovative firms more likely to cooperate than larger firms, ceteris paribus. While in the first 
stage ML (see  equation T2.1d),  size  was  unsignificantly  positive,  correcting  for  internal 
R&D  expenditures  in  the  second  stage  leaves  a  significantly  negative  size  coefficient 
Likewise for the industry dummies which failed to show up significantly in the first stage 
estimation, a significantly negative effect is found in the second stage results, indicating that 
the typically high-tech sectors are less likely to be engaged in cooperation, after correcting 
for  the  positive  effect  of their  internal  R&D  expenditures.  Companies  with  a  more 
pronounced  research  orientation  are  found  to  have  a  higher  likelihood  of cooperation, 
supporting  the  theoretical  hypotheses  put  forward  supra.  Foreign  ownership  has  no 
significant additional effect on the probability of cooperation.  Likewise, diversification fails 
also  here to  have any significant impact.  While government subsidies have a  significant 
positive effect in the first stage estimation, this effect seems only to come about through its 
effect on internal funding,  since the subsidy variable fails  to show up  significantly in the 
second stage estimation and is hence not included in the second-stage. 
Insert Table 3 here 
6  Only  for  intra-regional  contracting  flows,  a  distinction  is  made  between  firms  and  research 
institutions.  But  these  intra-regional  flows  account  only  for  one  quarter  of the  total  contracting 
expenditures. 
7  Kleinknecht & Reijnen (1992),  ignoring the  two-way  relationship between  R&D  and  cooperation 
find  no  significant  effect  of R&D  intensity  on  the  likelihood  of cooperation  (except  with  foreign 
research  institutes).  They  do  however find  firms  with  a formal  R&D  department to  be  more  likely 
engaged in cooperation. 
13 Including  as  external  strategy  the  buying  of technology,  either  embodied  or 
disembodied,  seriously reduces the degrees of freedom  of the  model  and  introduces more 
multicollinearity with other external strategies, especially for R&D contracted out, certainly 
for  the  interaction terms.  The  reported  results  (see  esaution (n.2) in  Table  3)  reveal  a 
significant positive effect of externally bought technology on  internal  R&D  spending, but 
again only for  those companies with  absorptive capacity, as  measured through own R&D 
infrastructure.  This  result can  be  related to  the  fact  that  most of these  expenditures  are 
indirect through purchase of equipment which typically would still require own adaptation to 
yield innovative output. 
As alternative measures for  absorptive capacity, R&D  departments with personnel 
that has a doctorate degree was tried.  If the scientific profile of the researcher is  related to 
his willigness to absorb, this could leave a higher absorptive capacity for firms  employing 
doctors.  44%  of all  companies  with  staffed  R&D  departments  have  personnel  with  a 
doctorate degree.  The basic results, reported in equation (T3.3), remain, i.e. only for firms 
with absorptive capacity, cooperation is  associated with higher internal R&D  levels, while 
absorptive  capacity  influences  positively  the  effect  of contracting  on  internal  R&D. 
Similarly,  absorptive  capacity  could  be  related  to  the  science  base  of  a  company. 
Constructing a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm has a staffed R&D department 
and is engaged not only in development but also in (fundamental) research, i.e.  58% of all 
firms with staffed R&D departments, leaves again similar results. 
Unfortunately the information on cooperation doesn't allow to disentangle the many 
different forms  of cooperation,  but they do  allow to distinguish among different types of 
partners in collaboration.  Cooperation with research institutes (including universities) seems 
again to have no effect on internal R&D efforts.  But when absorptive capacity is present in 
the form of a staffed R&D department, collaborating with such institutes is again associated 
with higher internal R&D expenditures.  These results are shown in  equation (T3.4) where 
the dummy variable COOPRI  is defined to only include those firms cooperating with research 
institutes. 
Splitting  the  sample  according  to  firm  or  industry  characteristics  could  reveal 
whether such characteristics as size, ownership structure or technology regime are important 
in determining the relationship between external and internal sourcing and the effectiveness 
of  absorptive capacity.  A number of  such splits were tried but resulting in too low degrees of 
freedom  for  the  two-stage  procedure.  Especially  the  probit  ML  procedure  leaves 
questionable validity of the model in  most subsamples.  Distinguishing small and medium 
sized  enterprises,  i.e.  those companies with  less  than  200  employess,  leaves only 47  data 
14 disembodied acquisition of foreign technology is considered.  The results confirm a positive, 
but less than proportionate size effect, which when further disentangled provides evidence of 
a non-linear relationship between size and R&D expenditures.  For foreign controlled firms, 
the size effect is larger.  Government support is found to stimulate internal R&D. 
Concerning  the  effect  of external  sourcing,  the  results  seem  to  indicate  that 
cooperation in  R&D has no  significant effect on own R&D  unless the firms  have  an  own 
R&D infrastructure, in which case cooperation stimulates internal R&D expenditures.  These 
results support the idea that indeed absorptive capacity is  necessary to  be able to capitalize 
on  the  complementarities  between  internal  and  external  know-how.  Also  other external 
sourcing strategies as R&D contracted out and technological purchases, mostly embodied in 
equipment,  is  found to significantly stimulate own R&D  only when absorptive capacity is 
present. 
The  two-stage estimation  procedure taking  into  account the  simultaneity between 
internal  R&D  and cooperation allows  to  conclude that  not only does  cooperation  induce 
internal R&D spending, at least when absorptive capacity is present, but also that at the same 
time firms who spend more on internal R&D have a higher probability of engaging in R&D 
cooperation. 
Despite its restricted scope in terms of number of companies and variables included, 
these results  are  interesting,  if only because they fit  into  a  not particularly strewn  set of 
empirical  studies  on  the  effects  of external  sourcing.  They  clearly  demonstrate  the 
complexity of the relationship.  Whether external sourcing can stimulate own R&D clearly 
depends on firm characteristics such as the presence of absorptive capacity.  More work is 
needed to  identify specific characteristics  generating this  absorptive  capacity.  The  results 
indicate  that  having  own  in-house  full-time  staffed  R&D  departments,  serves  as  an 
instrument  to  induce  positive  effects  of  cooperation  on  internal  R&D,  while  this 
complementarity may be even higher for foreign controlled firms. Other firm characteristics 
such as  size, the technological environment in which the firm  is  embedded, its  cumulative 
experience and central positions in networking, need further investigation on larger and more 
detailed data sets.  Taking an even more indepth look at internal firm structure, linking to the 
organisational  structure of companies  (e.g.  centralized vs  decentralized,  team  oriented  vs 
functional),  as  well  as  HRM  policies  vis-a-vis  R&D  personnel,  could  give  additional 
evidence  on  the  potential  to  assimulate  external  ideas,  further  characterizing what  could 
generate absorptive capacity.  The present results,  including some limited evidence on  the 
scientific  profile  of researchers,  failed  to  provide  clear  evidence  for  higher  levels  of 
openness, generating more complementarities. More research is  also  necessary to  examine 
16 why different modes of external sourcing may have a different impact.  In this respect the 
analysis should be extended to also include unvoluntary transfers of know-how. And finally, 
where the analysis presented here was limited to the effect of external strategies on internal 
R&D expenditures, the productivity of  these strategies in terms of generating more or more 
profitable innovations and future profits still needs to be assessed. 
17 TABLE 2: Regression results 
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.005  (.374)  .300  (.655).1  08 
Note: Between brackets are standard errors.  Also indicated are the significance levels. 
For the probit ML the R2 is calculated from  1-(2LogL (interceptonly)/-2LogL(intercept and covariates) 






























For the probit ML the R2 is calculated from 1-(2LogL (interceptonly)/-2LogL(intercept and covariates) 
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